Capitalist Expansion and the Decline of Common Property Ecosystems: Lessons from China, Vietnam and India by Sugden, Fraser & Punch, Samantha
1 
 
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Sugden, F. and Punch, S. (2014), 
Capitalist Expansion and the Decline of Common Property Ecosystems in China, Vietnam 
and India. Development and Change, 45: 656–684, which has been published in final form at 
https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12103. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in 
accordance With Wiley Terms and Conditions for self-archiving.  
 
2 
 
CAPITALIST EXPANSION AND THE DECLINE OF 
COMMON PROPERTY ECOSYSTEMS IN CHINA, 
VIETNAM AND INDIA 
 
Fraser Sugden and Samantha Punch 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article identifies some of the multiple processes of capitalist development through which 
access to common property resources and their utility for communities are undermined. Three 
sites in upland Asia demonstrate how patterns of exclusion are mediated by the unique and 
selective trajectories through which capital expands, resulting in a decline of common 
property ecosystems. The process is mediated by economic stress, ecological degradation and 
political processes such as state-sanctioned enclosure. The first case study from Shaoguan, 
South China indicates how rapid capitalist industrialization has depleted the aquatic resource 
base, undermining the livelihoods of fishing households yet to be absorbed into the urban 
working class. At the second site, in Phu Yen, Vietnam, capitalist development is limited. 
However, indirect articulations between capitalism on the lowlands and the peasant economy 
of the uplands is driving the commercialization of agriculture and fishing and undermining 
the utility of communal river and lake ecosystems. In the third site, Buxa in West Bengal, 
India, there is only selective capitalist development, but patterns of resource extraction 
established during the colonial period and contemporary neoliberal ‘conservation’ agendas 
have directly excluded communities from forest resources. Restrictions on access oblige them 
to contribute subsidised labour to local enterprises. The article thus shows how communities 
which are differentially integrated into the global economy are excluded from natural 
resources through complex means. 
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INTRODUCTION: MECHANISMS OF EXCLUSION FROM COMMON 
PROPERTY RESOURCES 
 
Land-poor and marginalized households are disproportionately dependent upon common 
property resources (CPRs) such as forests, reservoirs or rivers to supplement fragile 
livelihoods (Agarwal, 1998; Beck and Ghosh, 2000; Dey, 1997; Luttrell, 2006). In the 
context of neoliberal globalization and unprecedented capitalist expansion into peripheral 
regions, there is a trend whereby the utilization of common property resources by 
marginalized groups is being increasingly constrained on economic, ecological and political 
levels. This has occurred through competition with large-scale industrial users of resources 
with associated ecosystem degradation (Agarwal, 1998; Ho, 2006; Sikor and O’Rourke, 
1996); and through degradation by users themselves for multiple reasons including livelihood 
insecurity (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987), or the demands of a market economy combined 
with the undermining of customary management systems (Hoàng, 2011; Sikor, 2002).  
 
Access is also constrained through political mechanisms whereby management regimes 
exclude marginal users in order to pursue a commercial or ‘conservation’ agenda. Exclusion 
can emerge for example, through unequal power relations in planning which culminate in 
reduced access rights amongst marginal users (Cleaver, 1999, 2001; Platteau and Abraham, 
2002); or the wholesale ‘privatization’, sometimes termed ‘enclosure’, of common property 
resources (Dey, 1997; Harvey, 2003; Hue, 2008; Hue and Scott, 2007; Parayil and Tong, 
1998). More recently, Hall et al. (2011), focusing more specifically on land (both common 
and private), identify a more complex range of political power relations through which 
communities in Southeast Asia are excluded from natural resources under capitalist 
globalization. These include legislative frameworks or access rules, direct coercion, and the 
market forces of capitalism itself, such as the price mechanism. All of these processes are 
supported by a set of legitimating ideologies, often of the state.  
 
This article builds upon the above literature to uncover the diverse processes associated with 
capitalist globalization through which communities are excluded from natural resources, with 
a focus on those which are common property. However, specific links are drawn with the 
unique trajectories of capitalist growth in peripheral regions. There is a tendency for 
scholarship to focus on the unprecedented expansion of capitalism under globalization, 
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signalling an almost inevitable dissolution to pre-capitalist social relations (Sugden, 2013). 
Contemporary scholarship in the field of agrarian change has demonstrated, for example, how 
state cut-backs in peripheral economies under neoliberalism and growing export-oriented 
sub-sectors intensifies differentiation within the peasantry, a pre-cursor to capitalist 
development (Akram-Lodhi, 2007, 2008; Bernstein, 2003; Oya, 2001). Some studies even 
suggest that the drive by capital from more developed regions to locate ‘super-profits’ 
requires differentiation by extra-economic means (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Harvey, 2003; 
Patnaik, 2007). In the contemporary periphery, this is characterized by the appropriation of 
land for capitalist investment, often with the support of foreign capital (Harvey, 2003). 1    
 
This article seeks to demonstrate that capitalist expansion can be more selective, and that it 
does not necessarily ‘dissolve’ older economic formations. The latter can persist, yet also 
articulate with capitalism. The article illustrates the complexity of the contexts in which the 
rural poor are excluded from common property resources under neoliberal globalization, with 
processes including ecological pressure, economic stress and unequal political power 
relations, including state-sanctioned enclosure. Most significantly, the ways in which these 
processes are constituted is itself shown to be linked to the selective expansion of capitalism 
and persistence of older economic formations.  
 
A central tenet of the Althusserian tradition of political economy was to identify historical 
individualities of given social formations rather than attempting to fit what is observed into a 
pre-ordained evolutionary framework, in this case driven by a vision of an all-powerful, all-
encompassing capitalism. The underlying dynamics of social transformation can only be 
uncovered through the historical analysis of empirical data for geographically and historically 
specific conjunctures (Raatgever, 1985). A body of literature from sub-Saharan Africa has 
shown how the diversity of pre-capitalist economic formations can lead to considerable 
variation in the trajectories of change which arise from contact with the market (Dupré and 
Rey, 1979; Geschiere and Raatgever, 1985; Meillassoux, 1973). This involves a complex 
interplay between not only economic but political and ideological processes. A key process 
identified by this scholarship is the articulation of modes of production (a term initially 
                                                 
1 While some of these studies have pointed to a more complex pattern of change with ‘petty 
commodity production’ persisting to serve capitalism (Bernstein, 1977, 2003; de Janvry, 1981), these 
studies tend to imply that these older forms are functionally ‘dependent’ upon capitalism which is 
always the dominant force (see Sugden, 2013). 
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coined by Althusser and Balibar, 1968), whereby capitalism co-exists and articulates with 
older economic formations. The internal structure of the older mode of production may allow 
it to maintain relative autonomy, even while supplying labour or commodities to capitalism.  
 
This article uses elements of this approach, yet considers how these diverse processes of 
capitalist expansion mediate ecological change and acess to natural resources. Furthermore, 
whilst recognizing the selective trajectories of capitalist development, it does also show that 
market-led globalization has invariably led to a decline in common property ecosystems for 
marginalized communities. The character of this decline is shaped by the unique mechanisms 
through which capital expands into localities. The term ‘common property 
resources/ecosystems’, as used in this article, refers to ecosystems not owned by individual 
households or enterprises, which allow a set of users full or partial access to exploit natural 
resources without payment (Wade, 1987). This should be distinguished from ‘open access 
resources’, where there are no pre-defined set of users or rules (Dasgupta, 2008; Ostrom, 
1990). However, the line between the two is not clear cut, and the degree to which the 
ecosystems described here are ‘regulated’, either formally or informally, is variable.  
 
The article begins by outlining the methods and political-economic contexts of the study sites 
and goes on to identify the shifting interactions between communities and their environments 
in the context of economic change. 
 
 
Site Selection and Methods 
 
The research on which this article is based was part of a multi-partner, multi-disciplinary 
European Commission funded project which analysed aquatic resource use and associated 
conservation and management dilemmas in five upland watersheds of China, Vietnam and 
India. The three case studies chosen for this paper have comparative histories, whereby over 
the last three centuries, coercive state formations have gradually increased their control over 
land and natural resources, shaping the trajectory of livelihoods and nature–society 
interactions. However, during the twentieth century, capitalism has achieved quite different 
levels of dominance. Shaoguan district of South China is a region with a rapidly advancing 
industrial economy. Phu Yen district in northern Vietnam is a remote region with only small-
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scale proto-capitalist development on the valley floor alongside the Song Da reservoir. Buxa 
in India’s West Bengal lies in the foothills of the Bhutan Himalaya and was long a frontier 
region where livelihoods depended entirely upon forest and river resources, although it has a 
more recent history of colonial resource extraction.  
 
The livelihoods element of this project included a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques in a process of triangulation in line with the project’s interdisciplinary agenda (see 
www.higharcs.org). At each field site a sample of three rural villages were chosen. Field sites 
and villages were selected by in-country teams on the basis that they were dependent on the 
same aquatic ecosystem (i.e. river basin) and were located in upland regions. Using a wealth 
ranking exercise in consultation with local leaders and key respondents, a stratified sample of 
thirty households in each village were selected for an in-depth survey, totalling ninety 
households (thirty poor, thirty medium and thirty rich). Quantitative data was collected on 
livelihood activities, sources of income and asset ownership, followed by more open-ended 
questions. To gain deeper qualitative insights, focus groups were conducted: ten groups each 
of men, women, girls and boys , totalling forty at each site. Participatory techniques were 
used, including community resource mapping, production of historical and annual timelines, 
and livelihood ranking activities. The quantitative data was analysed using SPSS and a 
thematic analysis was conducted for the qualitative data.  
 
 
BACKGROUND TO LIVELIHOODS AND PROCESSES OF CAPITALIST 
EXPANSION 
 
Shaoguan, China 
 
Shaoguan, a prefecture-level city with a large rural hinterland, lies in Guangdong province in 
South China. The focus of the study was on three villages that traditionally depend on fishing 
along the Beijiang river. Lishi village is at the lower end of the Wujiang River, Kengkou is 
located on the Beijiang River downstream from Shaoguan city, and Zhoutian is upstream (see 
Figure 1). One common historical process which has been present in all three field sites has 
7 
 
been a pattern of feudal subordination2 long before the emergence of socialist or capitalist 
economic formations. Although it is impossible to generalize a complex, regionally diverse 
history, up until the mid-twentieth century, the rural economy in China has often been 
considered feudal in character (see Schwartz, 1954). While private property rights to land 
were relatively well developed by the eighteenth century, and there was an independent 
peasantry, large landlords had significant class power and, alongside a powerful state 
apparatus, appropriated much of the surplus (Feuerwerker, 1984). Through their income from 
landlordism, the bureaucracy, money lending and commerce, they were able to increase their 
wealth and buy up the private plots of individual peasants (Schwartz, 1954).3  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Guangdong was one of the more developed provinces from the eighteenth century onwards 
(Buoye, 1993). There was a burgeoning commercial sector with an expanding market for land 
and commodities, inter-provincial trade and production of commercial crops. Nevertheless, 
persisting landlordism combined with population growth led to critical land shortages and 
growing disputes between and within the tenant and landlord class (ibid.). This offers some 
background to the oral histories of the fishers in the Beijiang watershed. The ancestors of the 
fishers of Zhoutian reported that around two centuries ago, they had been tobacco farmers in 
Shixing county. Due to increasing population and limited land, they migrated to the banks of 
the upper Beijiang river to work as labourers in the river transport sector. In the past rivers 
were crucial routes for the transport of commodities, and large boats would be pulled 
upstream by groups of labourers using ropes. This provided employment to the farmers from 
Shixing. However, when they started families they could not support themselves with their 
meagre earnings, and became dependent upon fish from the Beijiang river (household 
interview, Zhoutian, July 2010).4 
 
                                                 
2 The predominant attributes of feudalism alluded to by Marx (1932) include control over land by a 
minority class with political and ideological as well as economic power over a peasant majority and 
appropriation of surplus in kind by rent or usury, often through extra-economic means. 
3 In the early twentieth century, prior to the Communist victory, Brandt and Sands (1990) estimate 
that up to a third of land was not owned by peasants but rented.   
4 In Lishi and Kengkou villages, the history is less clear, although it was reported that the population 
of both villages migrated to their present location around two centuries ago from Heyuan city 
(household interview, Lishi, July 2010). 
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The Communist revolution spurred a dramatic structural transformation. Agriculture as well 
as livelihood activities dependent upon common property resources such as fishing were 
transformed according to socialist principles, with fishing cooperatives established in 1958 
(Liu et al., 2011). Households would sell fish to the cooperative and receive payment from 
the government.  
 
It was only during the 1980s that capitalist industrialization emerged from within the socialist 
system. Fishing and agriculture were decollectivized, and fields were distributed in a largely 
egalitarian manner under a lease system (Eyferth et al., 2003; Luong and Unger, 1998). 
Whilst providing new opportunities for individual generation of wealth, differentiation 
inevitably increased (Luong and Unger, 1998). Although fishing offered few possibilities for 
accumulation, it was reported that up until the 1990s fish stocks were abundant. The river 
could provide a relatively comfortable subsistence. Many fishers diversified their livelihoods 
by working in small-scale industries, many of which had previously operated as collectives. 
 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, rapid capitalist industrial development ensued across 
China, bolstered by a strong state apparatus. Provinces such as Guangdong were lead players 
in the new Chinese economy, and Shaoguan (both the urban area and surrounding counties) 
experienced rapid industrialization. In 1978 the secondary (manufacturing) sector in 
Shaoguan was worth just Rmb 464,000;  by 2008 it was worth a staggering Rmb 26.256 
billion (Luo et al., 2011).   
 
Today, fishing continues as a key livelihood activity for many households in Lishi, Kengkou 
and Zhoutian. However, there is negligible ‘capitalist’ differentiation within these 
communities, and most fishers can be considered a single ‘class’ in the Marxian sense. There 
are differences in wealth with some households better endowed than others with regards to 
nets and equipment. However, the household survey shows that fishing is not a source of 
‘accumulation’ and fishing incomes have declined significantly since the 1990s. The only 
two households displaying capitalist tendencies and employing labour had diversified into 
new sectors, one operating a commercial pig and fish farm and the other a shoe business. The 
younger generation today are being drawn into an expanding class of capitalist labourers. 
Fishing is now a supplementary source of income, eclipsed by income from work in factories 
both locally and in nearby cities (see Figure 2). Household members are thus engaged in a 
9 
 
pre-capitalist economic formation based upon subsistence fisheries which is in rapid decline, 
while simultaneously labouring in the capitalist sector. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
 
Phu Yen, Vietnam 
 
In the district of Phu Yen, in the west of Son La province, three villages in the two communes 
of Tuong Ha and Tuong Tien were selected for the research (see Figure 3). The valley is 
culturally diverse, with a predominant population of the Muong and Thai minority on the 
lower slopes and valley floor, while smaller H’mong communities reside in villages on the 
higher slopes.   
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Unlike Shaoguan, the minorities of remote Son La province were historically at the margins 
of state control, particularly in the pre-colonial period. Sets of villages or muangs operated as 
relatively autonomous units ruled over by a phiia or chief (Hoàng, 2011; Sikor, 2001b). All 
land could be considered the common property of the muang, although there was a complex 
management regime with the level of regulation varying according to the land type. Hoàng’s 
(2011) study of the Thai communities in the Phu Yen valley notes that the most important 
wet rice land was controlled by the community, with plots being allocated for a period of 
time according to household need. Upland fields for shifting cultivation could be claimed 
from the forest and households maintained the right to collect forest products; thus the rules 
for exploiting these resources were more open, so long as one was not from outside the 
muang. Although land was held communally, Hoàng’s study from Phu Yen and Sikor’s 
(2004) from nearby Yen Chau district, show that hierarchies still existed. The phiia was 
considered the symbolic owner, with control over production process including the allocation 
of plots of paddy land, rights to collect a share of paddy as tax before it was distributed, and 
rights to personal plots of the best land.   
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The onset of French colonialism, rather than implanting capitalism, served to reinforce pre-
capitalist inequalities (Dao, 1993). For example, in neighbouring Yen Chau, Sikor (2004) 
notes how the French demanded large taxes and corvée labour contributions from the Black 
Thai leaders, a burden which was passed on to the peasantry. This parallels oral histories in 
Tuong Ha and Tuong Tien. One elder Thai respondent in the research recalled that after 
planting rice, corn and cassava, local people were obliged to give a share as tax directly to 
local leaders. These intermediary tax collectors became de facto land owners, channelling 
revenue to the French colonial regime while retaining a portion for personal use, and 
employing their poorer counterparts as sharecroppers (household interview, Tuong Tien, 
April 2010).   
 
Following independence from the French in the 1950s, the new communist government 
pursued land redistribution from large landlords to landless peasants (Kerkvliet, 2006; Sikor 
and Truong, 2002). This was followed by a policy of collectivization, whereby land, labour 
and other resources were shared (Sikor, 2001a), once again as a highly regulated common 
property regime. Wet rice lands were administered by the newly created communes, and as in 
China, households worked together for points according to labour hours, which were 
converted into shares of food and money. Households continued to independently farm 
cassava and other crops on the wooded upper slopes as in the past, although state regulations 
increasingly sought to limit the size of fields and discourage shifting cultivation (fieldnotes, 
April 2010). Sikor (2004) notes, however, that regulations for the use of upland forest land in 
the northern highlands were not strongly enforced, particularly as forests were placed under 
state control, undermining traditional management institutions (Hoàng, 2011). Nevertheless, 
Folving and Christensen (2007), in a study from two nearby communes in Phu Yen, 
suggested that there were well-defined systems of customary tenure within the community 
that determined which land could be cleared by families. Respondents in Tuong Ha 
commented that extensive tracts of forest land remained intact during the communist period, 
suggesting the uplands were managed sustainably. It therefore could not be considered as 
‘open access’.  
 
From the 1980s, external interventions by the state prompted considerable transformations to 
the livelihoods of the valley. Between 1986 and 1989 households moved to higher ground to 
make way for a new reservoir which would flood the valley following the construction of the 
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Soviet-funded Hoa Binh dam downstream. A large portion of the most fertile rice land was 
permanently lost under water, while some land was now flooded seasonally, allowing just 
one rice harvest. This reservoir however, represented a new common property ecosystem, and 
fishing activities were increasingly promoted and supported through the government’s Project 
747 (Do et al., 2011). By the late 1980s, economic problems facing the cooperative farms, 
combined with a growing influence of neoliberalism, led to a government policy of 
liberalization or doi moi, literally ‘renovation’ (Hue, 2008). This resulted in the de-
collectivization of agriculture, which finally paved the way for capitalist penetration.   
 
While capitalist agricultural development and industrialization accelerated in lowland 
Vietnam, with differentiation and intensified class inequalities (Akram-Lodhi, 2005; Hue and 
Scott, 2007), the character of capitalist expansion was more selective in the isolated 
communities of Phu Yen. Although there were no large-scale capitalist farms or industries as 
in Shaoguan, small-scale cash crop production has developed, providing corn and cassava for 
sale in lowland urban centres. Income is also generated through the sale of reservoir 
resources and lowland traders visit the commune daily to collect shrimp to take to the plains. 
However, unlike in Shaoguan where fishers have no involvement in agriculture, the 
households in Phu Yen simultaneously fish in the reservoir, while producing commercial 
crops on upland fields and grain staples on lower slopes. Figure 4 shows that for the sampled 
households, income from fish and crop sales are on average the most important source of 
income. Although supplying produce to capitalist markets, the household remains the 
predominant unit of production, and pre-capitalist patterns of subsistence peasant farming 
persist alongside commercial activities. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
The root of these articulations between the peasant economy of the uplands and the capitalist 
markets of the lowlands evidently lies in growing cash demands and indebtedness associated 
with the liberalization process. Interviews revealed that in the collective era the communes 
were able to retain a degree of self-sufficiency. Following liberalization, however, cash needs 
had expanded considerably for various reasons. First, local people now had access to 
commodity markets as restrictions on inter-provincial trade were lifted as part of the 
liberalization process. Coupled with an expansion of the transport network, traders could now 
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purchase agricultural produce to transport to the lowlands, while bringing in consumer goods 
(Sikor and Vi, 2005). In this context households displayed a desire to invest in luxury 
consumer goods such as televisions, fridges and mobile phones which are often beyond their 
usual purchasing power (see also Hoàng, 2011), as well as in expensive upgrades to houses 
(see Figure 5). Second, in the transition to a market economy, cash was now needed for social 
services which were once provided by the state such as education and healthcare (see Figure 
5). The combination of easily available low-interest credit from microfinance banks and high 
expenditure has intensified cycles of indebtedness, to banks as well as to an emerging class of 
local money lenders. Third, prior to the building of the dam and the flooding of the valley, 
most households could meet their grain staple needs through rice farming but now families 
need cash to buy rice. The cumulative effect of growing cash needs is the expansion of cash 
crop production on upper slopes, and fishing.   
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
 
Buxa, India 
 
Buxa is a forested region in the Dooars, the forest belt of West Bengal’s Jalpaiguri district in 
Kalchini subdivision, where the Siwalik range of Himalayan foothills meets the plains. Today 
it is home to the Buxa Tiger Reserve, a protected region of rich forest and aquatic 
biodiversity. Three village clusters were the focus of the study: Buxa Fort consists of small 
settlements in the hills around a ruined colonial era fort; Adma is a remote set of hamlets in 
the valleys to the west; and Jayanti lies on the gentle alluvial slope where the hills meet the 
plains (see Figure 6).   
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
Phu Yen and Buxa share similar histories, both being frontier regions home to minority 
communities, with limited state influence. The predominant population of the Buxa plains 
was made of indigenous communities such as the Meche and Garo, while the hilly tract was 
home to Dukpa (the majority ethnic group in Bhutan) who were later joined by migrants from 
Nepali communities such as the Limbus and Magar (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). Across the 
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North Bengal frontier, agriculture was characterized by shifting cultivation or jhum by the 
indigenous communities who lived in small settlements, led by a Mandal or headman (Ray, 
2002). The uncultivated forest lands and rivers were extensive, and were largely common 
property rather than being owned by individual households (ibid.). Although there was 
limited centralized regulation of these resources, it would be wrong to term them ‘open 
access’, as indigenous communities may have had their own system of rules within localities.   
 
As had occurred across South and Southeast Asia, the imposition of centralized state 
formations had a lasting impact on indigenous modes of production. One of the first 
significant states to emerge was that of Bhutan. When the entire Dooars region was annexed 
in the 1700s, Bhutan enforced its authority over forest-dwelling communities by requiring 
them to provide labour service as well as levying taxes on the use of irrigation channels, on 
plying boats, on weaving looms and on squatting in the jungle (Chaudhuri, 1995; Ray, 2002). 
In the lowlands, the Bhutanese encouraged settlement and land reclamation from the forest 
(Ray, 2002). Enterprising peasants from the south, or jotedars, were given incentives to clear 
the jungle and bring in tenants to farm under feudal relations (Chaudhuri, 1995). This process 
saw the slow contraction of the forest frontier, although much of the Buxa population 
remained scattered and free from state control, with livelihoods dominated by shifting 
cultivation (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). In this context, many forest resources informally 
remained as common property, even though land was being increasingly parcelled up 
amongst the new rulers. 
 
After the Anglo-Bhutan war in 1846, the British colonial state annexed the Dooars from 
Bhutan, and by the late nineteenth century, the influence of capitalism had increased through 
the coercive mechanisms of the state. On the edge of Buxa forest in regions already under 
permanent cultivation, rather than seeking to impose capitalist social relations, the British 
formalized the existing hierarchy of jotedars and their tenants, the chukanidars and adhiyars 
(Ray, 2002). By preserving this hierarchy and the right to sub-let land, the clearing of forest 
could be accelerated, while the expansion of colonial control could be facilitated (Chaudhuri, 
1995). While in Phu Yen, Vietnam, capitalism had a more limited impact on livelihoods 
during the colonial period, the British colonialists in Bengal recognized the potential of the 
resource-rich Dooars for commercial forestry and tea production, and by the late nineteenth 
century, finance capital expanded into the region as European companies set up plantations 
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on the forest fringe (Ray, 2002). Paralleling trends across North Bengal and Assam, the 
British encouraged the migration of adivasi (indigenous) groups from central India to meet 
labour shortages (Grunning, 2007 [1911]).  
 
Across the Dooars, many former forest-dwelling communities were now working as landless 
tenants for new jotedar settlers under semi-feudal relations of production (Chaudhuri, 1995; 
Ray, 2002), although within the Buxa jungle itself communities continued to follow 
indigenous livelihood patterns. However, the wooded area was shrinking with the expansion 
of new jotedar estates, tea cultivation, and indiscriminate felling by timber traders. The 
colonial state was increasingly concerned with securing strategically important timber 
supplies (Banerjee et al., 2010) for the expansion of railway networks and to supply boxes for 
the tea industry (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). It was in this context that new legislation had a 
lasting impact upon the remaining communities of forest dwellers.   
 
The Forest Act, which forms the basis of contemporary legislation, was implemented in 1865.  
The Act appointed a settlement officer to look into the ‘claims’ of users and decide which 
forests should be put under state control. Land in Jalpaiguri district was now classified into 
three categories: agricultural land, tea garden and reserved forest (Bhowmik, 1988). Colonial 
sources indicate that by 1879, 280 square miles of country had been declared as reserved 
forest in Jalpaiguri district, encompassing much of the Buxa region (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). 
The Forest Act not only prohibited the expansion of cultivation in land classified as ‘reserved 
forest’, but it essentially gave the state legal backing to extinguish pre-existing informal 
rights of local people to forest resources with limited negotiation (Banerjee et al., 2010). The 
pre-existing rights included agricultural and livelihood activities such as shifting cultivation, 
hunting and the collection of firewood and non-timber forest products: these were now 
criminalized. State-run forestry enterprises were given monopoly over resource extraction 
operations and the sale of timber to the markets of Kolkata and Dhaka proved highly 
profitable5 (Grunning, 2007 [1911]).   
 
The restrictions on access to forest lands meant forest dwellers could no longer meet their 
subsistence needs through agriculture. Forest enterprises had a valuable opportunity to exploit 
                                                 
5 The net profit in Buxa division increased from Rs 6,093 in 1900–01 to Rs 99,673 by 1907–08 
(Grunning, 2007 [1911]). 
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this destitution. ‘Forest villages’ were specifically set up to provide a labour force for forestry 
operations across Jalpaiguri district (Grunning, 2007 [1911]). Small plots of land were 
distributed to former jungle dwellers as well as migrants, who were expected to cultivate sal 
and teak monocultures alongside subsistence plots. In return for the right to reside in the 
forest they were obliged to provide un-waged labour or begar to the Forest Department’s 
operations (Banerjee et al., 2010), in a bonded labour relationship. Jayanti was set up as one 
of these ‘forest villages’, and being at the foot of the mineral rich Siwalik hills, it was also 
home to a dolomite mine and processing factory. Nepali, Bengali and adivasi labourers from 
the surrounding estates and agricultural land were brought in to work in the mine, expanding 
the settlement’s population. Despite the criminalization of forest-based livelihoods, most 
communities had no option but to continue to use the jungle for small-scale agriculture, 
collection of forest produce, herding and fishing in order to subsist. Paradoxically, these pre-
capitalist livelihood activities ensured the reproduction of a cheap labour force for the forest 
villages.6 
 
The primary difference with Vietnam and China in the second half of the twentieth century 
was that the colonial economy of India essentially remained in place, despite the transition to 
home rule. There was no ‘socialist’ revolution. There was some emerging capitalist industry 
in urban centres, but in the Dooars, the primary sector-based colonial economy of tea 
production, forestry and mining coexisted with a pre-capitalist sector of small-scale peasant 
farming and older forest-based activities, which provided it with labour (see Sugden, 2010). 
Begar obligations were abolished in the 1960s following considerable agitation by forest-
dwelling communities (Banerjee et al., 2010). However, the Forest Department still restricted 
livelihoods, and households were obliged to provide low-wage labour to the Forest 
Department, the dolomite mine, and contractors involved in activities such as stone collecting 
on the Jayanti river. Use of the forest was tolerated by the state to a limited extent, as this was 
the only means through which labour could be reproduced and wages remain low.  
 
Participation in the capitalist sector therefore was not through commercial agriculture and 
commoditization as in Phu Yen, but through the supply of low-wage labour, mediated by the 
coercive mechanisms of the colonial and post-colonial state. However, it is important to note 
                                                 
6 In other words, some of the subsistence needs are met through pre-capitalist activities, allowing 
lower wages to be paid, a process noted in Sugden (2013). 
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that as with Phu Yen, the older pre-capitalist livelihoods grounded in natural resource 
dependent activities persisted alongside wage labour. In this context, far from capitalism 
dissolving these older formations, it in part perpetuates them as they provide capitalism with 
a source of surplus. 
 
 
CAPITALIST INDUSTRIALIZATION, ENVIRONMENTAL DECLINE AND THE 
EXPANDING WORKING CLASS 
 
The following section considers how common property resource based livelihoods have fared 
under the different trajectories of capitalist expansion identified above, using the findings 
from the field research.  
 
 
Ecological Change through Rapid Capitalist Industrialization 
 
The first identified process through which common property resource based livelihoods are 
undermined is ecological change, whereby small-scale users come into competition with 
large-scale industrial users who deplete ecosystems or render them unusable. Inevitably, 
these phenomena are associated with regions undergoing rapid industrialization such as 
China and Vietnam. In China, for example, as well as experiencing large-scale deforestation,7 
industrial and urban pollution has resulted in 25,000 km of rivers failing to meet the water 
quality standards necessary for aquatic life as of 2004, while irrigating land with polluted 
water is estimated to cost the economy Rmb 7 billion a year (World Bank and SEPA, 2007). 
Industrial development and large-scale commercial agriculture and fisheries production have 
also undermined ecosystems in parts of Vietnam (Sikor and O’Rourke, 1996). However, in 
this study, given the relative isolation of Phu Yen, it is in Shaoguan, China that these 
processes are most visible. In fact, the Shaoguan fishers’ gradual assimilation into the 
working class is closely linked with growing competition with industrial users of the Beijiang 
river (Liu et al., 2011).   
 
                                                 
7 Forest cover was found to have decreased by 4.54 million hectares between the 1984–88 and 1989–
93 inventories, and by a further 1.23 million hectares by 1994–1998 (Ho, 2006). 
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The river remains a common property resource allowing fishing without payment. There are a 
series of constantly evolving government programmes to regulate the use of water resources 
in the basin (so it cannot be considered ‘open access’), although laws regulating the activities 
of fishers have only a limited impact on fishers’ livelihoods. The licensing system stipulates 
the number of boats and engine sizes, but there are no regulations on the types of fishing 
equipment, and fishing without a licence is tolerated (Jiang et al., 2011). The fishers’ use of 
this common property ecosystem therefore has not been undermined through direct exclusion 
or ‘enclosure’, but as a result of the gradual, yet severe, degradation of the natural resource 
base.   
 
The annual fish harvest from the Beijiang river reached 8,000 tons in the 1950s, including 
many high-value and rare local species. Since 2000, however, annual fishing production has 
not exceeded 2,000 tons, and most fish caught are lower-value species (Jiang et al., 2011). 
The degradation of the river ecosystem is closely connected with unprecedented industrial 
expansion. First, sand mining, which was mechanized in the mid-1990s, has mushroomed, 
providing materials for the burgeoning urban construction sector. It has changed the structure 
of the river bed, and has influenced the hydrological regime and sand silt characteristics. 
Some river banks have collapsed, the water level has dropped markedly in some locations, 
blocking the movement of boats, while other channels have become narrow (Han et al., 2005; 
Qian, 2004). It has also influenced nutrient cycling and has altered the ecosystem of fish. In 
Zhoutian, for example, the fishers noted it had caused a decline in water grasses, impacting 
fish breeding.   
 
Second, water pollution has caused the biological accumulation of toxic material across the 
food chain. In the past, the fishers reported that they used to swim in the river, but now it 
would cause them to fall sick. Some respondents stated that fish had a diesel oil taste, 
lowering their value. Sources of pollution include effluent from industries, such as the iron 
mine near Kengkou village, and diesel leakage from transport barges or sand mining boats, 
not to mention urban waste. Respondents noted that growing urban prosperity has meant 
people buy many more manufactured products, the packaging of which can end up in the 
river.  
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Finally, hydropower developments have had a significant impact on fish stocks. The 
utilizable hydropower in the Beijiang watershed reaches 1,474,000 kW and there are 1,989 
small-scale hydropower stations (Jiang et al., 2011). The construction of dams, both large and 
small, has changed the ecological structure, such as the hydrology, water quality, sediment 
levels and quantities of aquatic organisms. Furthermore, dams limit the migration of fish, and 
when the dam is opened, many fish are lost by being washed downstream. On an economic 
level, the deeper water means fishers have had to change their nets, and the dam’s location 
restricts where they can take their boats.   
 
Management regimes for industries do exist, including pollution discharge fees and water 
environment standards and monitoring (Jiang et al., 2011). Furthermore, pollutant 
discharging enterprises are supposed to be strictly controlled in terms of the quality, 
concentration and volume of waste which is released into rivers. Nevertheless, analysis with 
stakeholders suggest that laws are poorly implemented, a reminder that there is no clear cut 
difference between regulated ‘common property’ and ‘open access’ resources. For example, 
despite sharing authority in water governance, there is limited coordination for monitoring 
between different government agencies involved with the environment, construction, 
agriculture, geology and mining, fisheries and shipping. This allows some enterprises to 
bypass regulations, whilst impeding the introduction of new rules. The Shaoguan Fisheries 
Agency, for instance, consulted hydropower dams on the feasibility of charging them fishery 
resources compensation tax in 2004 and 2006, but due to the lack of authorization from 
formal legislation, the agency did not have the power to follow this up. There is also a lack of 
coordination between different administrative zones, and the legal responsibility of upstream 
enterprises whose pollution affects downstream regions remains unclear. Many rules are 
perceived as ambiguous, and legal loopholes have allowed some dams in the Shaoguan 
district to bypass the need to perform an Environmental Impact Assessment (Jiang et al., 
2011). 
 
A further factor, and perhaps the most significant, is the issue of power relations associated 
with capitalist expansion and the mediating role of the state. There was a strong perception 
within the fishing communities that corporations had the power to avoid regulations, or that 
they were of such economic importance that the state turned a blind eye. With sand mining in 
particular — arguably the most destructive use of the river — we discussed options for more 
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effective regulations with fishers. However, respondents dismissed our ideas, believing it 
would be impossible to control the mining activities. They felt the root cause of this problem 
was that local government leaders are only in office for four years, so they concentrate on 
maximizing short-term economic growth, even though they know that sand mining is 
destructive.   
Interestingly, farmers reportedly received compensation from sand mining companies due to 
the damage to river banks adjacent to villages, while fishers received nothing. Luong and 
Unger (1998) suggest that in the post-reform period, an important axis of differentiation 
alongside one’s access to capital, is one’s political authority, or position in the ‘bureaucratic 
rank order’. Well-connected peasant households are able to build up effective patronage 
networks with local officials, offering opportunities for wealth accumulation (Luong and 
Unger, 1998; Yan, 1992). The farming population is not only significant, but also forms an 
important lobby group. Fishers recalled in interviews that if farmers had not received 
compensation from the sand miners, they would probably have put pressure on the state to 
control their activities. In contrast, fishing communities tend to have little involvement in 
politics and they do not have any formal representation as a community. The lack of political 
power in the hands of fishers perhaps partially explains why their alienation from the means 
of production (the river) and absorption into the urban working class is proceeding at a much 
faster pace than that of their farmer counterparts. 
 
In sum, ecological decline and unequal political power relations in the management of river 
resources has meant that fishing is no longer sufficient to meet households’ subsistence 
needs.  As Figure 2 suggests, households are increasingly dependent upon the labouring 
income provided by sons and daughters. The closure of smaller local enterprises in recent 
years, with the rise of larger-scale factories in cities, means that migration for work is 
increasing (fieldnotes, July 2010). Payment for factory work is around Rmb 1,000–1,200 
(US$ 152–181) per month for a 9–10 hour day (household interview, Lishi, August 2010). 
Most concurred that it was difficult to support a nuclear family on this income in urban 
China, let alone the extended family. Therefore, despite falling catches and destruction of the 
ecosystem, fishing remains a crucial source of subsistence for the older generation, 
particularly given the limited welfare provision under a liberalized economy. There are also 
limited opportunities for the older generation to join the urban labour force (Sugden and 
Punch, 2013). Some perceive they lack the necessary skills: ‘We are old and do not know 
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anything, nobody need us [in the city]’ (men’s focus group, Kengkou, August 2010). Whilst 
today small-scale fishing, a remnant of an older pre-capitalist economic formation, 
‘subsidizes’ the labour of the urban capitalist economy by providing for the older generation, 
the future prospects for this livelihood activity remain limited. 
 
 
Commercialization of Peasant Production and Environmental Decline  
 
Whilst fishers in Shaoguan face environmental decline from rapid industrialization, in regions 
lacking significant capitalist development, degradation and ecological change can be due to 
over-use by small-scale users themselves. In upland regions of Vietnam this phenomena still 
has an intricate association with the dynamics of capitalist expansion, as older economic 
formations — under stress from economic liberalization and growing cash needs — articulate 
with capitalism through unsustainable patterns of cash crop production and fishing. At the 
same time, growing inequalities in a market economy often oblige land-poor households to 
intensify the extraction of natural resources (Sikor, 2002, 2004). 
 
In the case study from Phu Yen, the expansion of cash crop production under the pressures of 
a market economy has led to a significant reduction in the size of forest ecosystems which 
were once the common property of communities (Do et al., 2011). This parallels trends 
across Vietnam. Between 2000 and 2005, the coverage of primary forest across the country 
declined by 14.59 per cent, at the rate of 20,000 ha per year. Between 2005 and 2010 this had 
levelled off, yet forest cover still declined by 1.21 per cent in this period (FAO, 2010).8 
Although the land allocation acts of the 1990s delineated ownership to fixed private upland 
fields on the forested slopes in Tuong Ha, demarcation was reportedly poorly enforced. The 
demand for cash which had driven the expansion of corn production led to a significant 
increase in the cultivated area in the years following decollectivization as households 
‘claimed’ fields from the forest as private holdings (focus groups, Tuong Ha, March 2010). 
Hoàng (2011) notes that the state in Phu Yen district was not able to control forest use as 
effectively as the customary management systems of the past. The elimination of indigenous 
                                                 
8 Although there was an increase in planted forests, cover only rose by 6.39 per cent for 2000–05, and 
4.68 per cent for 2005–10. 
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institutions combined with economic liberalization has thus aggravated deforestation since 
the 1980s.9 
 
Nowadays, regulations are more strictly enforced by the commune. The richest forest land 
has been set aside as protected forest, where local people have limited access rights (focus 
groups, Tuong Ha and Tuong Tien, April 2010). Households have also been given 2 ha each 
of upland to develop into ‘managed’ forests, although the quality of the land and productivity 
of forestry is poor and requires a capital investment beyond the reach of poorer households.   
 
The massive reduction in primary forest cover, combined with strict regulations on the use of 
remaining forest, has made the shifting cultivation of the past virtually impossible. Land can 
no longer be left fallow for long periods, reducing natural fertility, while deforestation has led 
to significant soil run-off. Many of the H’mong community from above Tuong Ha have 
migrated to Moc Chau district to locate better agricultural land (household interview, Dan-1, 
April 2010). Many of the local Thai and Muong, however, have become more dependent 
upon fishing, which offers more secure returns than agriculture, taking loans to invest in 
boats and equipment. Paradoxically, at the same time, increased soil erosion in the watershed 
has undermined the quality of the main remaining common property ecosystem, the reservoir. 
Local people reported in interviews that post-rain run-off from surrounding deforested 
hillsides has caused the water which was once ‘clear’ to become cloudy, increasing water 
turbidity and undermining fish reproduction. Although the intensification of fishing has 
brought short-term benefits and boosted the local economy, there is a perception that stocks 
have been falling, with certain species such as eel, turtles and a cat fish known as cá quât, 
being rarely seen nowadays. Lift nets, which catch a large number of immature fish, are 
viewed as particularly destructive (fieldnotes, April 2010). This fall in stocks is 
understandable given that the reservoir remains virtually an open access resource: there are 
limited state-enforced rules regulating fishing and no restrictions on households from outside 
the area coming to fish in the reservoir.10  
 
                                                 
9 In Hoàng’s (2011) study from further upstream in the Phu Yen valley, deforestation is primarily due 
to the demand for high-value timber produce in the lowlands rather than demand for land to grow cash 
crops, although the process of rising cash needs amongst the local population is the same.  
10 There was also no evidence of the emergence of indigenous institutions regulating fishing similar to 
those present for the use of common lands in the past. This is unsurprising: there were large numbers 
of fishers coming from a wide area, making it difficult to develop or enforce rules (see Ostrom, 1990). 
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While it is evident in Phu Yen that articulations between a peasant economy and capitalism 
are undermining common property ecosystems, the growing inequalities in such regions 
which are yet to experience full capitalist development, add a new dimension. As Sikor and 
Nguyen (2007) argue with reference to Vietnam’s Central Highlands, whether or not one can 
benefit from environmental resources is often dependent upon one’s political and economic 
resources. This is an important issue in the context of environmental decline. The one 
ecosystem which retains its use value in Phu Yen is the reservoir. However, as the aquatic 
natural resource base declines, benefits are increasingly cornered by the wealthier households 
with access to capital, despite the fact that poorer households are arguably more dependent 
upon the reservoir. Utilizing their income from other capital-intensive activities such as 
aquaculture and livestock raising, richer households can afford to invest in equipment such as 
motorized boats and larger seine nets.   
 
Only three households categorized as ‘poor’ in the wealth ranking own more expensive wood 
or metal boats, as opposed to seven households in the ‘medium’ category and seven from the 
‘rich’ category. Poorer households are more likely to fish using small boats and simpler 
technologies such as shrimp traps. The boats used to lay and collect traps can be built for 
around 300,000 VND (US$ 15), while traps are often given in advance by intermediaries who 
later buy the catch, reducing the fisher’s bargaining power at the time of sale. For such 
households, fishing can only be done for six months a year when the water level is high in the 
vicinity of the village. Their wealthier counterparts, however, can travel to distant parts of the 
reservoir all year round to locate the richest stocks of fish, something particularly important 
given the fragile natural resource base. It is important to note that these wealthier fisher and 
farmers cannot yet be considered a ‘capitalist’ class. There is little evidence of significant 
accumulation of wealth and much labour is still carried out by the household members 
themselves, suggesting the peasant economic formation is not in decline. Nevertheless, the 
process of differentiation in access to natural resources is intricately tied to the emerging 
articulations with the capitalist economy of the lowlands which provides new (albeit limited) 
opportunities for wealth generation. 
 
 
Natural Resource Extraction, ‘Conservation’ and Enclosure 
 
23 
 
The third process through which communities are marginalized from common property 
ecosystems is via conservation-driven enclosure, a process which occurs not due to 
ecological or internal economic stress, but due to externally imposed intervention on a 
political level. It has already been shown that in Buxa, India, the colonial and post-colonial 
state directly restricted access to forests to protect reserves of timber and create a captive 
labour force. The enclosure of common property resources for commercial exploitation is 
widespread under neoliberalism in post-colonial economies driven by natural resource 
extraction (see e.g., Nguiffo, 1998). This further undermines fragile ecosystems as short-term 
profit outweighs considerations of the long-term environmental impact. It can also worsen 
degradation by users themselves. Like in Phu Yen, over-use by marginalized communities 
occurs on land which has not yet been privatized (Ho, 2006; Johnson, 2004; Parayil and 
Tong, 1998; Rangarajan and Shahbuddin, 2006). 
 
In Buxa, the process of enclosure has taken on a more complex character in recent years as 
‘conservation’ has taken precedence over resource extraction. While essential for protecting 
biodiversity, conservation is also instrumental to capitalist growth (Brockington and Duffy, 
2010). On one level, conservation has been argued to have ‘ideological’ power, associated 
with the commoditised images of nature and romanticised wilderness (Brockington and 
Duffy, 2010). This ideology can be connected to expanding sectors under neoliberal 
globalization, such as tourism (Duffy and Moore, 2010). On another level, conservation 
offers more explicit material gains to capital through, for example, the profits in protecting 
genetic resources (Brockington and Duffy, 2010). Furthermore, restrictions on livelihoods 
can provide new sources of surplus through creating a captive labour force no longer able to 
meet their subsistence needs through forest-based activities alone (Sodikoff, 2007, 2009) — a 
process already established in Buxa by forest protection laws with an extractive orientation. 
 
The use of conservation as a justification for controlling access to ecosystems became 
widespread only in the early 1970s (Rangarajan and Shahbuddin, 2006). Buxa was declared a 
Tiger Reserve in the 1980s, paralleling clampdowns on forest use across West Bengal. In the 
whole state, 5,032 people were arrested collecting firewood and non-timber forest products in 
1996–7 (Banerjee et al., 2010). The dolomite mine was closed in the 1980s, and the railway 
which once served it fell into disrepair. Today, the forest department is seeking to evict 
inhabitants from many forest villages, particularly from ‘enclave villages’ such as Jayanti, 
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deep in the forest (ibid.). Across India, 2,904 families have been displaced since the inception 
of Project Tiger in the 1970s (Kabra, 2009).   
 
Forest dwellers continued to reside in the newly designated tiger reserve, although severe 
restrictions on access to forest resources remained in place, and there was a deep sense of 
mistrust towards the forest authorities and a resentment of its policies. The sentiments were 
echoed during a focus group discussion in Buxa cluster: ‘we love nature, we love the forest, 
but we do not need the Forest Department’ — a statement which drew a round of applause.  
 
This could indicate a changed character of capitalist infiltration. While there has been a 
decline in revenue-generating forestry operations, enclosure for conservation has still served 
the interests of the capitalist sector. The subjugation of older modes of production to 
capitalism in the context of ecosystem enclosure are very similar to the colonial and post-
colonial periods which were driven by efficient resource exploitation. On the one hand, 
households displaced from the reserve are still likely to create an easily exploited labour force 
with limited resources (Kabra, 2009). On the other hand, for those who remain in the forest 
and on its fringe, the stricter forest laws reproduce the economic insecurities which have been 
drawing households into the labour force since colonial times. 
 
In the context of an aggressive conservation agenda, it is only in the very remote cluster of 
Adma that forest-based livelihoods are nearly sufficient for households’ subsistence needs, 
and continue to follow long-established patterns. Livelihoods include limited cultivation, 
herding in the forest and the raising of livestock in temporary pastures. In many ways its 
remoteness from state control allows the pre-capitalist mode of production to persist here 
with a level of autonomy not present elsewhere. In the main villages of Buxa Fort and Jayanti 
cluster, forest department restrictions mean that pre-capitalist natural resource based 
livelihoods persist, but they are rarely enough on their own for subsistence, and labouring 
remains a primary source of income. 
 
While the move towards a conservation agenda has reportedly caused a decline in forest-
based wage labour, it is evident in Figure 7 that households have simply diverted their labour 
to new sectors of the capitalist economy, particularly the burgeoning construction sector in 
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growing urban centres. There is today a considerable amount of seasonal out-migration11 to 
cities such as Kolkata, Siliguri and Delhi, while some of the Drukpa community who are 
familiar with the language and culture regularly migrate to Bhutan for construction work, 
although they lack citizenship papers so can only secure menial employment. ‘Other labour’ 
in Figure 7 includes jobs associated with the conservation enterprise itself: portering goods 
for forest officials and maintaining trails for forest guards (Sodikoff, 2007). This labour is 
partially subsidized by agriculture, livestock rearing and gathering, which perhaps explains 
why some forest-based livelihoods are tolerated.  
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
Resource extraction by more powerful actors is still allowed in the reserve, a process also 
observed in other protected regions of India (Rangarajan and Shahbuddin, 2006). The 
collection of rocks from the river in Jayanti is one example, and many of the local people 
labour for urban contractors. In fact, across India between 1980 and 2003, the government 
approved forest land use ‘diversion’ of an area of 7,903 ha of forest in which 5,888 ha were 
allocated for boulder collection (Banerjee et al., 2010). Tourism development also has 
increased considerably over the last decade, absorbing some local labour in the numerous 
guesthouses along the river bank in Jayanti, a site of natural beauty and a prime spot for 
viewing animals. There are contradictory processes at play with regards to these two sectors. 
Rock collecting had previously been banned, but was permitted again in recent years, while 
the government has recently sought to restrict tourist access to the reserve, despite Buxa 
being a key attraction in tourism promotional campaigns for the Dooars. This suggests that 
there are different interests within the state which promote ‘conservation’, tourism and the 
more traditional colonial agenda of resource extraction.   
 
This case study illustrates that as long as the state tolerates the presence of forest dwellers 
following highly restricted livelihood patterns, a supply of cheap labour for the plantation and 
forestry-based capitalist sector in North Bengal region will continue to be provided. The 
forest is converted into a ‘partial’ common property resource, whereby some level of use is 
                                                 
11 Note that most seasonal migrant labour is classified as ‘wage work’ in Figure 12. [presume you 
mean Figure 7. The figure actually uses the term ‘wage labour’] ‘Income from family members living 
outside’ generally refers to remittances from longer term migrants. 
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tolerated, but only to the extent that communities are still obliged to enter the labour force to 
meet the remainder of their subsistence needs. By retaining a limited pre-capitalist mode of 
production grounded in small-scale agriculture, fishing and non-timber resource harvesting, 
labour is ‘subsidized’ and wages can remain low. Sodikoff (2007) suggests that conservation 
involves an interesting contradictory process, whereby forest-based livelihoods continue to be 
tolerated in reserve forests, both subsidizing labour power and increasing the subjective 
human ‘threat’ to biodiversity, which in turn continues to increase its value as a conservation 
hot spot.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This article has identified three inter-connected and complex processes of capitalist 
expansion through which access to common property ecosystems has been undermined. The 
decline of these resources has been shown to occur on an ecological level due to 
environmental degradation; on an economic level due to livelihood insecurity, debt and rising 
cash needs; and on a political level through unequal power relations, coercive measures of the 
state and enclosure. The character and relative importance of these three processes in 
mediating the nature–society nexus in each site is intricately connected to the unique ways in 
which capitalism interacts with older economic formations.  
 
In Shaoguan, China, the decline in common property resources is primarily due to ecological 
change in the context of competition with large-scale resource users in this rapidly 
developing capitalist economy — although on a political level, power relations which reduce 
the voice of fishers in river basin planning remain important. The decline in common 
property resources parallels the decline in older economic formations and the gradual 
assimilation of fishers into the urban working class. In Phu Yen, Vietnam, the degradation of 
the ecosystem has also been a central process through which common property ecosystems 
have been in decline. However, degradation here is by small-scale users themselves. This is 
connected to internal economic stress brought about when the capitalism of the urban centres 
interacts with the older economic formations of the uplands, increasing local cash needs and 
demand from lowland markets for fish and cash crops. The end result is a decline in the 
natural resource base and a reduction in the utility of ecosystems to all but a few 
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‘accumulating’ households. In Buxa, India, it has not been environmental degradation which 
has undermined common property dependent livelihoods but direct exclusion on a political 
level through state-sanctioned enclosure. Enclosure emerged first through the need for the 
state to corner natural resources to feed the capitalist primary sector of the region. More 
recently exclusion has been driven by a conservation agenda, retaining the forest as a tourist 
resource, while also facilitating the creation of a cheap labour force, subsidized in part by 
more restricted forest-based livelihoods. 
 
The three case studies have illustrated that global processes like capitalism take specific local 
forms related to national and regional socio-economic and political systems as well as to the  
specific historical characteristics of a region. The three cases do, however, clearly 
demonstrate a shared contemporary process: the decline of common property ecosystems 
with market globalization. Whilst recognizing the different trajectories of capitalist 
development, it is evident that wholesale waged labour and subordination to market or 
commercial imperatives have resulted in fundamental changes to common property 
resources. 
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Figure 1: Location Map of Shaoguan field site  
 
Figure 2: Average cash income by households over last month in Shaoguan sample in 
Chinese Renminbi (Rmb) (source: survey) 
 
Figure 3: Location map of Phu Yen field site 
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Figure 4: Cash income over last month by Phu Yen sampled households in Vietnamese Dong 
(VND) (source: survey) 
 
 
Figure 5: Average expenditure over last year by Phu Yen sampled households in Vietnamese 
Dong (VND) (source: survey) 
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Figure 6: Location map of Buxa field site 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Average cash income by households over last month in Buxa in Indian Rupees 
(source: survey) 
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